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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—My two last Numbers were devoted principally to the task of endeavouring to convince the Prince Regent and the public, that it was neither dangerous nor dishonourable to yield to the terms upon which we might have had, and may yet have, peace with America; and, to my great mortification, though, I must confess, not much to my surprise, I now see, from the contents of the last Gazette, wherein is His Royal Highness's "*Declaration*," that all my endeavours have been of no avail, and that war, long, expensive and sanguinary war, will now take place with an enemy, who, above all others, is capable of inflicting deep wounds upon this already-crippled, or, at least, exhausted nation. —From the first publication of the Letters which passed between Lord Wellesley and Mr. Pinckney, soon after the French had announced their intention to repeal the Berlin and Milan Decrees; from the very day of that publication, which took place soon after I was imprisoned in Newgate for two years (with a fine to THE KING, which I have since paid, of a thousand pounds) for having written and published upon the subject of flogging certain English militia-men, at the town of Ely, in England, who had been first reduced to submission by German Troops; from the very day of that publication I began to fear the present sad result of the dispute which had then assumed a new and more serious character than it had ever before worn. With that fear in my mind, I bent all my feeble powers towards preventing such result. I have failed: opinions and counsels the direct opposite of mine have prevailed; and time will show who was right and who wrong. —Upon former occasions the real grounds of war have, but too often, been lost sight of in the multitude and confusion of subsequent events; the Government has had the address to inlist the passions of men on its side, and the voice of reason has been stifled. —But, here, as I was from the first resolved it should be, there is a clear, a distinct, an undisguisable ground

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before our eyes; we know well what we are at war for: we know, and must bear in mind, that we are at war for the purpose of *enforcing our practice of stopping American vessels upon the high seas, and taking out of them all such persons as our naval officers may deem to be British seamen.* —This is now become the clearly defined subject of the war with America. —The "*DECLARATION*," which will be found below, inserted at full length, does not contain any *new* matter: it is a summary of what our ministers have before alleged, and asserted in their correspondence with the American Government and its divers agents. But, there are some few passages of it which require to be particularly noticed. —The question relating to the Orders in Council has been before so amply discussed, in my several Letters and articles upon the subject, that I will not encumber my present remarks with any thing relating thereunto; but, will confine myself to what relates to the impressment of persons out of American ships on the high seas. —Upon this point the "*DECLARATION*" says: "His Royal Highness can never admit, that in the exercise of the *undoubted* and hitherto *undisputed right of searching neutral merchant vessels in time of war*, the impressment of British seamen, when found therein, can be deemed any violation of a neutral flag. Neither can he admit, that the taking such seamen from on board such vessels, can be considered by any neutral State as a hostile measure, or a justifiable cause of war. —There is no right more clearly established, than the right which a Sovereign has to the allegiance of his subjects, more especially in time of war. Their allegiance is no optional duty, which they can decline, and resume at pleasure. It is a call which they are bound to obey: it began with their birth, and can only terminate with their existence. —If a similarity of language and manners may make the exercise of this right more liable to partial mistakes, and occasional abuse, when practised towards the vessels of the United States, the same circum-

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"stances make it also a right, with the exercise of which, in regard to such vessels, it is more difficult to dispense."—The doctrine of *allegiance*, as here laid down, I admit, with some exceptions; but, as to the right of impressing British seamen, on the high seas, out of neutral ships, I deny it to be founded on *any* principle or maxim, laid down by *any* writer on public law. Indeed, the "DECLARATION" does not say that it is: it says, that the right of SEARCHING neutral vessels in time of war is "*undoubted and has hitherto been undisputed.*" This is not correct; for, not only has even *this* right been doubted, not only are there two opinions about it in the books on public law, but the writers on public law are, for the most part, *against* the said right *as we practise it*, and they contend, that we have no right to seize enemy's goods on board of merchant ships which are neutral. Nay, the contest has given rise to military resistance on the part of our now-ally, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden; and, what is still more, Great Britain ceased, upon their *threats*, to exercise this, even *this*, right of seizing *enemy's goods* on board of neutral ships of war.—But, this right; this right of SEARCHING neutral ships; what has it to do with the *impressment of persons* on board of such ships? That is what the Americans object to, and are at war against. They are not at war against our right of *search*, even in our own interpretation of that right. What they object to is, the stopping of their vessels on the high seas, and taking *people* out of them by force; a practice which, I repeat it, is sanctioned by no principle or maxim of any writer on public law, nor by any usage heretofore known in the world.—The "DECLARATION" does not assert, as Lord Castlereagh did, in his letter to Mr. Russell, that this practice is sanctioned by any former usage; but, it *declares* the right from the *right of search*. It says, that, in exercising "the right of search," that is to say, the right to search for articles *contraband of war*, and for *enemy's goods*, we have a right to impress British seamen, if we find them. So that, this is the new shape of the defence of the practice: we do not now assert that we have a right to stop American vessels upon the high seas *for the purpose* of impressing our seamen; but, having stopped them for the purpose of exercising our old "*right of search*," we have a right to avail ourselves of the opportunity to take out persons, *British or other officers*, at their discretion,

may judge to be British seamen.—This is not even *plausible*, in my opinion; for, what right can we have to impress, if we have no right to stop for the purpose of impressing? I may enter another's house to search for a stolen coat, and, if I find there my hat, I may seize it as well as my coat, having due authority for the first; but, be it observed, that to steal the hat was as criminal as to steal the coat; and, if I had known, or suspected, that the hat was there, I might have had my search-warrant for the former as well as for the latter.—The law of nations calls the high seas the common right of nations. A ship there is a parcel of the State to which she belongs, and the sovereign rights of that State travel with her. The sole exception is, as has been before stated, that belligerents have a right to search neutrals for *goods of the enemy*, and for *warlike stores and troops*, carrying for the enemy's use; because, as far as neutrals are engaged in such a service, they are deemed to be *in the service of the enemy*.—In all other respects a neutral ship carries with her, on the high seas, the rights of sovereignty appertaining to the State to which she belongs.—Now, it is well known, that no nation has a right to enter the territory of another to exercise any authority whatever, much less that of seizing persons and carrying them away by force; and, indeed, is it not fresh in every one's memory, what complaints were made against the French for entering the territory of the Elector of Baden, and seizing the Duke of Enghein?—If we have a right to enter American ships on the high seas, and take out of them, by force of arms, British seamen, what should hinder us from having the same right as to any of the sea-ports of America? Nay, why should we not go and seize our numerous manufacturers, who have been (contrary to our laws) carried to America, and who are filling America with cloths and cutlery? Their alleging, that they went thither to avoid the effect of prosecutions for libel, or for some other of our state crimes, would be no bar to our claim upon them; and, in short, they could never be safe to the last moment of their lives.—It is said, that the seamen on board of American ships are *deserters*. Be it so. We may be sorry that they do desert; but it is no crime in the Americans that our sailors go into America. Is it not well known, that numerous deserters from the Austrian and Prussian armies have, at all times, deserted into the neighbouring States; and is it not equally



well known, that the neighbouring State has invariably possessed the undisputed right of giving them protection, and of inlisting them in its service?—Why, therefore, should we deem it a crime in America, whose abundance of lands and provisions, whose high price of labour, and whose happiness to the lower orders of mankind, hold out their arms to the whole world?—And here I cannot help introducing a remark upon the proposition, made by Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Russell, that the American Government should stipulate to *deliver up* all British seamen in the service of Americans. Mr. Russell is said to have expressed himself as having been *shocked* at this proposition, which has afforded an abundant theme of abuse of him by our hireling writers. But, I have no scruple to say, that I firmly believe, that it is a proposition that never was before made to any independent State; even to the most petty State of Germany. There was a plan, some years ago, in agitation amongst the States of Europe, for putting in force a mutual surrender of each other's subjects, whereupon the Abbé Raynal remarks, that, if it had gone into effect, each of the several States might have taken the motto of *Dante* over the entrance to his *infernal regions*: "He who enters here leaves even *hope* behind." He represents it as the utmost stretch of tyranny; a point, he says, which the world ought to perish rather than reach. And, therefore, though Lord Castlereagh's proposition did not go this length; though it was confined to British seamen, we have no reason to abuse Mr. Russell for his expression.—It will be said, may be, that Mr. Russell was ordered to stipulate for the surrender, on our part, of all American seamen. Aye; but the difference is, that Mr. Russell proposed the surrender of those only who had been *impressed by us*; whereas we wanted to stipulate for the surrender of those British seamen who had gone into America of *their own free will*. We wanted to have surrendered to us, men who were employed in American *merchant* ships; they wanted us to surrender men, whom we had seized in their ships and forced into our *men of war*.—But, is it possible, that any one can find any thing to object to in a request, that, as a *preliminary*, we should give up the Americans, whom we had impressed into our service? What is the state of those men, now on board of our ships of war? What is their state? Has the reader reflected upon this? They must be useless

on board of ship; they must not act; they must do no seaman's duty; or, they must, according to our own doctrine, lately exemplified at Horsemonger Lane, be *TRAITORS*, worthy of being hanged, ripped up, and cut in quarters.—His Royal Highness's Declaration says, that allegiance to his father and his successors begins with a man's birth and ends but with his death. And, is it not the same with American citizens? Do they not owe similar allegiance to their country? Or is it about to be pretended, that none but kings can claim this sort of allegiance?—I do not think that any one, even of the writers in the Times and Courier, will have the impudence to set up this doctrine; but, this they must do before they can make out any good ground of charge against the Americans for having demanded, as a preliminary, the surrender of the impressed American seamen.—Captain Dacres, in accounting for the loss of his Frigate, expressly states, that he had *many Americans on board*, whom he permitted to be spectators, from a reluctance to compel them to fight against their country. And, can the reader believe, that this was the only instance in which native Americans were unwillingly serving on board of British ships of war? What, then, again I ask, must be the state of those Americans? And, what are we to think of those writers, who abuse Mr. Russell for proposing to us their surrender as a step preliminary to any further arrangement?—The Declaration complains, that America demanded the abandonment of the practice of impressment as a *preliminary* to her passing a law to prevent British seamen from being received on board her ships.—The hireling writers have treated this demand as something too insolent to be for a moment listened to. The "*DECLARATION*" does not treat it in this lofty style; but it speaks of it in pretty strong terms, as thus:—"The proposal of an armistice, and of a simultaneous repeal of the restrictive measures on both sides, subsequently made by the commanding officer of His Majesty's naval forces on the American coast, were received in the same hostile spirit by the Government of the United States. The suspension of the practice of impressment was insisted upon in the correspondence which passed on that occasion, as a *necessary preliminary* to a cessation of hostilities. Negotiation, it was stated, might take place without any suspension of the exercise of this right, and also without any armistice being con-

cluded: but Great Britain was required *“previously to agree, without any knowledge of the adequacy of the system which could be substituted, to negotiate upon the basis of accepting the legislative regulations of a foreign State, as the sole equivalent for the exercise of a right, which she has felt to be essential to the support of her maritime power.”*—Well, and what then? *“A right”* it is called again; but, if America *denied* it to be a right, as she has uniformly done, what wonder was there that she made the proposition? Great Britain might *“feel,”* though I should have chosen the word *“deem,”* as smacking less of the boarding-school Miss’s style; Great Britain might *“feel,”* if feel she must, that the practice complained of was essential to the support of her maritime power; but, did it hence follow, that America, and that impressed Americans, should like the practice the better for that? We have so long called ourselves the *“deliverers”* of the world, that we, at last, have fallen into the habit of squaring up all our ideas to that appellation; and seem surprised that there should be any nation in the world inclined to wish for the diminution of our power.—The Americans, however, clearly appear to see the thing in a different light. They, in their home-spun way, call us any thing but *“deliverers”*; and, it must be confessed, that, whatever may be our general propensity, we do not seem to have been in haste to *“deliver”* impressed American seamen.—That one nation ought not to yield a *“right,”* depending for compensation solely upon the legislative provisions of a foreign State, is very true; but, if the right be doubtful; if it be unsupported by any law, principle, maxim, or custom, then the case is different; and then, indeed, the offer of a legislative provision is a proof of a sincere desire to accommodate.—If my view of the matter be right, and I verily believe it is, this is the light in which that offer ought to be viewed; and I most deeply lament that it was not thus viewed by the ministers.—These lamentations, however, are now useless. The sound of war is gone forth: statement and reasoning are exhausted: the sword is to decide whether England is, or is not, to impress, at the discretion of her naval officers, persons on board American merchant ships on the high seas.—There is one passage more in the *“DECLARATION,”* upon which I cannot refrain from submitting a remark or two. After stating, that America has made only feeble remonstrances

against the injuries she has received from France, the *“DECLARATION,”* this *“memorable document,”* as the Courier calls it, concludes thus:—*“This disposition of the Government of the United States—this complete subserviency to the Ruler of France—this hostile temper towards Great Britain—are evident in almost every page of the official correspondence of the American with the French Government.—Against this course of conduct, the real cause of the present war, the Prince Regent solemnly protests. Whilst contending against France, in defence not only of the liberties of Great Britain, BUT OF THE WORLD, His Royal Highness was entitled to look for a far different result. From their common origin—from their common interest—from their professed principles of freedom and independence, the United States were the last power, in which Great Britain could have expected to find a willing instrument, and abettor of French tyranny.—Disappointed in this just expectation, the Prince Regent will still pursue the policy which the British Government has so long, and invariably maintained, in repelling injustice, and in supporting the general rights of nations; and, under the favour of PROVIDENCE, relying on the justice of his cause, and the tried loyalty and firmness of the British Nation, His Royal Highness confidently looks forward to a successful issue to the contest, in which he has thus been compelled most reluctantly to engage.”*—The last paragraph is in the old style, and will hardly fail to remind Mr. Madison of the documents of this kind, issued about *six-and-thirty years ago*. However, the style is none the worse for being old; though one cannot but recollect the occasion upon which it was formerly used.—I regret, however, to find, in this solemn document, a distinct charge against the American Government of *“subserviency to the Ruler of France;”* because, after a very attentive perusal of all the correspondence between the American and French Governments, I do not find any thing, which, in my opinion, justifies the charge. The truth is, that *“the Ruler of France”* gave way in the most material point to the remonstrances of America; and, I have never yet read a Message of Mr. Madison, at the opening of a Session of Congress, in which he did not complain of the conduct of France. The Americans abhor an al-

liance with France; and, if they form such an alliance, it will have been occasioned by this war with us.—This charge of subserviency to Buonaparté has a thousand times been preferred against Mr. Madison, but never, that I have seen, once *proved*. It is, indeed, the charge which we have been in the habit of preferring against all those powers, who have been at war with us: Spain, Holland, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and, though last not least, Russia, as will be seen by a reference to Mr. Canning's answer to the propositions from Tilsit.—“Subserviency to the Ruler of France!” We stop the American Merchantmen upon the high seas; we take out many of their own native seamen; we force them on board of our men of war; we send them away to the East Indies, the West Indies, or the Mediterranean; we expose them to all the hardships of such a life and all the dangers of battle, in a war in which they have no concern: all this we do, for we do not deny it; and, when, *after* MANY YEARS of remonstrances, the American Government arms and sends forth its soldiers and sailors to compel us to desist, we accuse that Government of “*subserviency to the Ruler of France*,” who, whatever else he may have done, has not, that I have ever heard, given the Americans reason to complain of impressments from on board their ships. Many unjust acts he appears to have committed towards the Americans; but he has wisely abstained from impressments, which, as I have all along said, was the *only ground* upon which the people of America could have been prevailed upon to enter heartily into a war with any power: it is a popular ground: the war is in the cause of the people: accordingly, we find the motto to the war is: “*Liberty of the seas and sea-men's rights*.”—I, therefore, regret exceedingly, that the “*DECLARATION*” styles America “*a willing instrument and abettor of French tyranny*.” It is a heavy charge; it is one that will stick close to the memory of those who support the war; it will tend to inflame, rather than allay, the angry passions; and, of course, it will tend to kill all hopes of a speedy reconciliation.—As to what the “*DECLARATION*” is pleased to say about the “*common origin*” of the two nations, if of any weight, it might be urged, I suppose, with full as much propriety by the Americans *against our impressments*, as it is now urged against their resistance. I

remember that it was urged with great force in favour of American submission to be taxed by an English parliament; but, as the result showed, with as little effect as it possibly can be upon this occasion.—There is one thing in this “*calling cousin*,” as the saying is, that I do not much like. The calling cousin always *proceeds from us*. The Americans never *remind us*, that we are of the same origin with them. This is a bad sign on our side. It is we, and not they, who tell the world of the relationship. In short, it is well enough for a news-paper to remind them of their origin; but, I would not have done it in a solemn Declaration; especially when I was accusing them of being the willing instrument and abettor of our enemy.—“*Common interest*.” That, indeed, was a point to dwell on; but, then, it was necessary to produce something, at least, in support of the proposition. The Americans will *query the fact*; and, indeed, they will flatly deny it. They will say, for they have said, that it is not for *their interest*, that we should have more power than we now have over the sea; and, that they have much more to dread from a great naval power, than from an overgrown power on the Continent of Europe. They are in no fear of the Emperor Napoleon, whose fleets they are now a match for; but, they are in some fear of us; and, therefore, they do not wish to see us stronger.—It is in vain to tell them, that we are fighting in defence of the “*liberties of the world*.” They understand this matter full as well as we do, and, perhaps, a little better. I should like to see this proposition attempted to be *proved*. I should like to hear my Lord Castlereagh, beginning with the Declaration against the Republicans of France, continue on the history of our hostilities to the present day, taking in those of India by way of episode, and concluding with the war for the *right of impressment*, make it out, *how we have been and are defending the liberties of the world*.—I dare say that his Lordship could make it out clearly enough. I do not pretend to question the fact or his ability; but, it would be at once instructive and entertaining to hear *how he would do it*.—“*From their professed principles of freedom*.” From these the “*DECLARATION*” says, that His Royal Highness expected the United States would have been the last power to become a willing instrument of *French tyranny*. Very true;

of *French tyranny*: but, that did not hinder him from expecting them to be the enemy of *impressing men from on board their ships*; and, it should have been shown how this disposition proved them to be a willing instrument of French tyranny, or of any tyranny at all.—It is useless to revile; it is useless to fly off to other matters. We impress men on board of American ships upon the high seas; we take out (no matter whether by mistake or otherwise) American seamen as well as English; we force them to fight on board our ships; we punish them if they disobey. And, when they, after years of complaints and remonstrances, take up arms in the way of resistance, we tell them that they show themselves the willing instruments and abettors of French tyranny.—I wish sincerely that this passage had been omitted. There are other parts of the “*DECLARATION*” that I do not like; but this part appears to me likely to excite a great deal of ill-will; of lasting, of rooted, ill-will.—I do not like the word “*professed*,” as applied to the American *principles of freedom*. The meaning of that word, as here applied, cannot be equivocal, and assuredly would have been better left out, especially as we never see, in any of the American documents, any expressions of the kind applied to us and to our Government.—But, to take another view of the matter, *why* should His Royal Highness expect the Americans to be disinclined towards France, because they profess principles of freedom? *Why* should he, on *this account*, expect that they would lean to *our side* in the war?—Does the Declaration mean to say, that the Government of France is more tyrannical than was that monarchy, for the restoration of which a league was made in Europe in the years 1792 and 1793? From its tone, the Declaration may be construed to mean, that *our* Government is *more free* than that of France, and that, therefore, we might have expected the Americans, who profess principles of freedom, to be on *our side* in a contest against “*French tyranny*.”—Hem! Mum!—Well, well! We will say nothing about the matter; but, it must be clear to every one, that the Americans may have their *own opinion* upon the subject; and, they may *express it too*, until we can get at them with an *Ex-Officio*. They may have their own opinion upon the matter; and their opinion may possibly differ from ours. They are, to be sure, at a great

distance; but, they are a *reading* and an *observing* and a *calculating* people; and, I’ll engage, that there is not a farmer in the back States who is not able to give a pretty good account of the blessings of “*English liberty*.”—Besides, leaving this quite out of the question; supposing that the Americans should think us freemen and the French slaves, why should that circumstance prevent them from leaning to the side of France? What examples of the effect of such morality amongst nations have the Regent’s ministers to produce? How often have we seen close alliances between free and despotic states against states either free or despotic? How often have we been on the side of despots against free States? England was once in offensive alliance with France against Holland; Holland and France against England; and, it ought never to be forgotten, that England, not many years ago, favoured the invasion of Holland and the subjugation of the States General by a Prussian army. Have we not formed alliances with Prussia, Austria, Russia, Spain, Naples, and all the petty princes of Germany against the *Republic of France*? Nay, have we refused, in that war, the co-operation of *Turkey* and *Algiers*? And, as for the old Papa of Rome, “*the Whore of Babylon*,” as our teachers call him, his alliance has been accounted holy by us, and his person an object of our peculiar care and protection.—Why, then, are we to expect, that America is to refrain from consulting her interests, if they be favoured by a leaning towards France? Why is she to be shut out from the liberty of forming connexions with a despotism, supposing a despotism now to exist in France?—The truth is, that, in this respect, as in private life, it is interest alone that guides and that must guide; and, in my mind, it is not more reasonable to expect America to lean on our side on account of the nature of the Government of our enemy, than it would be to expect a Presbyterian to sell his sugar to a Churchman, because the only man that bade him a higher price was a Catholic.—Here I should stop; but, an article, upon the same subject, in the Morning Chronicle of the 13th instant, calls for observation.—Upon the falsehoods and impudence of the Times and the Courier, that is to say, the principal prints on the side of the Wellesley party and that of the Ministers, I have remarked often enough. I was anxious to hear what the Whigs had to say, and here we have it.

Mr. Ponsonby and Mr. Brougham had pledged themselves to support the war, if America was not satisfied with the repeal of the Orders in Council; and here we have the *grounds* of that support. On this account the article is interesting, and, of course, worthy of an attentive perusal.

—"Notwithstanding the tedious length of the papers on both sides, the question between the Court of London and the Government of the United States is simply *the right of impressment of seamen on board trading ships*—and this is in truth the sole *cause* of the war.—If we were to examine the value of this cause to the two parties, it cannot be denied but that to the Americans it is *exceedingly slight*, and to the British *highly material*. The Americans cannot regard it as an *insult*, because it is a right which has been at all times asserted and acquiesced in by Sovereign States respectively. Then viewed as an *injury* what is it? That they shall go to war to prevent British subjects who have forfeited their allegiance, abandoned their country, and left their families probably starving, from being impressed on board their merchant vessels—that is to say; they claim the right to afford an asylum and employ the *refuse* of the British navy—men without principle, for it is only the profligate that are likely to become the objects of their protection. In this view, then, the point is of little consequence to the Americans, but it is interesting to the British to assert the power inherent in every State to reclaim its subjects; and the time may come when the principle would be equally important to America herself.—But, say the American Ministers, it is not so much the right itself, as the violent and insulting mode of exercising it that we complain of; for we have upon reflection agreed in the principle of international law, that free bottoms do not make free goods, and therefore we have no objection to the search of our merchant ships for contraband of war; but in that case, whenever warlike stores, &c. are found on board an American vessel, she is detained and carried into a port, for adjudication by a competent Court. Whether the adjudication be always impartial or not is another affair, but in this respect nations are on an equal footing, and these Admiralty Courts, well or ill-conducted, are recognized by all maritime nations. But with respect to the impressment of seamen, the act is violent

because summary, and because it is subject to no revisal—to no adjudication—and because the individual seized has no means of redress. By this sort of reasoning there is a tacit admission on the part of America, that it is not to the act itself which they object so much as to the manner of the act; and accordingly we see various suggestions made by Americans, for entering into an amicable discussion on the means of getting over the outrageous way in which the right is exercised, and of giving security to both nations against the abuse in question. On the other side, Lord Castlereagh declares the readiness of the British Government to receive and discuss any proposition on this subject coming from the American Government; though he would not enter into a negotiation, a preliminary to which should be the concession of this right, and so far we think he was clearly right.—But is it not monstrous that two people of common origin, and of almost inseparable interests, should remain at war on a point upon which there is so little difference between them? Surely without any sacrifice of etiquette on either side, the expedients might be canvassed, by which this mighty cause of war might be removed. Let each party promulgate their thoughts on the subject, and if there be an honest disposition to peace, it must follow.—The argument on both sides is short, and may be put in a few words. The agreement ought to be so drawn as to make it most dangerous to the Captain of an American ship to employ a British seaman on board; and, on the other side, to make it equally dangerous for a British Captain to seize and carry off an American seaman, under pretext of his being a British subject. Or, in other words, it ought to be made their interest to abstain from those two causes of national offence. Various modes have been suggested for this purpose.—The most effectual undoubtedly would be to ordain by a treaty, that the subjects of each power, if found on board the merchants' vessels of the other, should be considered in the nature of contraband of war, inasmuch as their natural Sovereign was thereby deprived of their service in war, and that that should be a cause to detain the vessel for adjudication. By this the American Captain or his owners would most seriously suffer by having British seamen on board; and, on the other hand, the Bri-

“tish Captain would equally suffer, if he
 “had all the risk and loss to incur of an
 “improper detention. Against this, how-
 “ever, the arguments are strong. The
 “American Captain may have been im-
 “posed upon by the similarity of language,
 “&c.; and when brought into one of our
 “ports, where there is a competent Court
 “to adjudge the point, a real American
 “seaman might find it impossible to ad-
 “duce proofs of his nativity. Besides, in
 “both events, the penalty would be inor-
 “dinate.—Another suggestion has been
 “made, that the British naval officer im-
 “pressing a seaman on board an American
 “vessel, and *vice versa*, should be bound
 “to make a certificate in duplicate (or
 “what the French call a *proces verbal*), to
 “the fact, one copy of which he should
 “deliver to the American Captain, and
 “transmit the other to the Admiralty to
 “be filed; and that the seaman seized
 “should have his action for damages in the
 “Courts of Law, the certificate to be pro-
 “duced by the Admiralty as proof of the
 “trespass, if the person can prove himself
 “to be a native of the country that he
 “pretended to be. We confess we think
 “that this ought to satisfy both Govern-
 “ments, for this would make officers cau-
 “tious in exercising the right which at the
 “same time cannot be safely surrendered.”
 This is poor, paltry trash. But, it contains
 one assertion, which I declare to be *false*.
 It is here asserted, that “the right of im-
 “pressment of seamen on board of trading
 “ships, is a right which has, *at all times*
 “*been asserted, and acquiesced in by sove-*
 “*reign states respectively.*”—I give this an
 unqualified denial. I say, that it is a
 right, which *no nation* has before as-
 serted, and that *no nation* ever acquiesced
 in.—Let the Morning Chronicle name the
 nation that has ever done either: let him
 cite the instance of such a practice as we
 insist upon; let him name the writer, every
 English writer, on public law, who has
 made even an attempt to maintain such a
 doctrine; nay, let him name the writer,
 who has laid down any principle, or maxim,
 from which such a right can possibly be
 deduced. And, if he can do none of these,
 what assurance, what a desperate devotion
 to faction, must it be to enable a man to
 make such an assertion! The assertion of the
 “value of the cause” being slight to Ame-
 rica, in comparison to what it is to us, has
 no better foundation. The *value!* what
 is of value, what is of any value at all,
 if the *liberty and lives of the people of*

America are of no value? And, when we
 know, when no man will deny, when
 official records of the fact exist, that
 hundreds of native Americans have been
 impressed and sent to serve on board our
 ships of war: when this is notorious; when
 it neither will nor can be denied, what is
 of value to America if this cause be not of
 value?—As to the proposition for making
 English seamen “*contraband of war*,” it
 is so impudent, it is so shameful, it is even
 so horrid, that I will do no more than just
 name it, that it may not escape the reader’s
 indignation.—Indeed, there needs no more
 than the reading of this one article to con-
 vince the Americans, that all the factions
 in England are, in effect, of one mind upon
 the subject of this war; and, I am afraid,
 that this conviction will produce conse-
 quences, which we shall have sorely to
 lament, though I shall, for my own part,
 always have the satisfaction to reflect, that
 every thing which it was in my power to
 do, has been done, to prevent those conse-
 quences.

WM. COBBETT.

Bolton, 14th January, 1813.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES.—Declaration of the
 Regent of England against them.

The earnest endeavours of the Prince Re-
 gent to preserve the relations of peace and
 amity with the United States of America
 having unfortunately failed, His Royal
 Highness, acting in the name and on the
 behalf of His Majesty, deems it proper
 publicly to declare the causes and origin of
 the war, in which the Government of the
 United States has compelled him to engage.
 —No desire of conquest, or other ordi-
 nary motive of aggression has been, or can
 be, with any colour of reason, in this case,
 imputed to Great Britain: that her com-
 mercial interests were on the side of peace,
 if war could have been avoided, without the
 sacrifice of her maritime rights, or without
 an injurious submission to France, is a truth
 which the American Government will not
 deny.—His Royal Highness does not,
 however, mean to rest on the favourable
 presumption to which he is entitled. He
 is prepared, by an exposition of the circum-
 stances which have led to the present war,
 to shew that Great Britain has throughout
 acted towards the United States of America

with a spirit of amity, forbearance, and conciliation; and to demonstrate the inadmissible nature of those pretensions, which have at length unhappily involved the two countries in war.—It is well known to the world, that it has been the invariable object of the Ruler of France, to destroy the power and independence of the British Empire, as the chief obstacle to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs.—He first contemplated the possibility of assembling such a naval force in the Channel as, combined with a numerous flotilla, should enable him to disembark in England an army sufficient, in his conception, to subjugate this country; and through the conquest of Great Britain he hoped to realize his project of universal empire.—By the adoption of an enlarged and provident system of internal defence, and by the valour of His Majesty's fleets and armies, this design was entirely frustrated; and the naval force of France, after the most signal defeats, was compelled to retire from the ocean.—An attempt was then made to effectuate the same purpose by other means; a system was brought forward, by which the Ruler of France hoped to annihilate the commerce of Great Britain, to shake her public credit, and to destroy her revenue; to render useless her maritime superiority, and so to avail himself of his continental ascendancy, as to constitute himself, in a great measure, the arbiter of the ocean, notwithstanding the destruction of his fleets.—With this view, by the Decree of Berlin, followed by that of Milan, he declared the British territories to be in a state of blockade; and that all commerce, or even correspondence with Great Britain was prohibited. He decreed that every vessel and cargo which had entered, or was found proceeding to a British port, or which, under any circumstances, had been visited by a British ship of war, should be lawful prize: he declared all British goods and produce wherever found, and however acquired, whether coming from the Mother Country, or from her colonies, subject to confiscation: he further declared to be denationalized the flag of all neutral ships that should be found offending against these his decrees: and he gave to this project of universal tyranny the name of the Continental System.—For these attempts to ruin the commerce of Great Britain, by means subversive of the clearest rights of neutral nations, France endeavoured in vain to rest her justification upon the previous conduct of His Majesty's Government.—Under

circumstances of unparalleled provocation, His Majesty had abstained from any measure, which the ordinary rules of the law of nations did not fully warrant. Never was the maritime superiority of a Belligerent over his enemy more complete and decided. Never was the opposite Belligerent so formidably dangerous in his power, and in his policy to the liberties of all other nations. France had already trampled so openly and systematically on the most sacred rights of neutral powers, as might well have justified the placing her out of the pale of civilized nations. Yet in this extreme case Great Britain had so used her naval ascendancy, that her enemy could find no just cause of complaint: and in order to give to these lawless decrees the appearance of retaliation, the Ruler of France was obliged to advance principles of maritime law unsanctioned by any other authority than his own arbitrary will.—The pretexts for these decrees were, first, that Great Britain had exercised the rights of war against private persons, their ships and goods, as if the only object of legitimate hostility on the ocean were the public property of a State, or as if the edicts, and the Courts of France itself had not at all times enforced this right with peculiar rigour. Secondly, that the British orders of blockade, instead of being confined to fortified towns, had, as France asserted, been unlawfully extended to commercial towns and ports, and to the mouths of rivers; and thirdly, that they had been applied to places, and to coasts, which neither were, nor could be actually blockaded. The last of these charges is not founded on fact, whilst the others, even by the admission of the American Government, are utterly groundless in point of law.

Against these Decrees, His Majesty protested and appealed; he called upon the United States to assert their own rights, and to vindicate their independence, thus menaced and attacked; and as France had declared, that she would confiscate every vessel which should touch in Great Britain, or be visited by British ships of war, His Majesty having previously issued the Order of January 1807, as an act of mitigated retaliation, was at length compelled, by the persevering violence of the enemy, and the continued acquiescence of neutral powers, to revisit, upon France, in a more effectual manner, the measure of her own injustice; by declaring, in an Order in Council, bearing date the 11th of November 1807, that no neutral vessel should

proceed to France, or to any of the countries from which, in obedience to the dictates of France, British commerce was excluded, without first touching at a port in Great Britain, or her dependencies. At the same time His Majesty intimated his readiness to repeal the Orders in Council, whenever France should rescind her Decrees, and return to the accustomed principles of maritime warfare; and at a subsequent period, as a proof of His Majesty's sincere desire to accommodate, as far as possible, his defensive measures to the convenience of neutral powers, the operation of the Orders in Council was, by an order issued in April 1809, limited to a blockade of France, and of the countries subjected to her immediate dominion.—Systems of violence, oppression, and tyranny, can never be suppressed, or even checked, if the power against which such injustice is exercised, be debarred from the right of full and adequate retaliation: or, if the measures of the retaliating power, are to be considered as matters of just offence to neutral nations, whilst the measures of original aggression and violence, are to be tolerated with indifference, submission, or complacency.—The Government of the United States did not fail to remonstrate against the Orders in Council of Great Britain. Although they knew that these Orders would be revoked, if the Decrees of France, which had occasioned them, were repealed, they resolved at the same moment to resist the conduct of both Belligerents, instead of requiring France, in the first instance, to rescind her Decrees. Applying most unjustly the same measure of resentment to the aggressor, and to the party aggrieved, they adopted measures of commercial resistance against both—a system of resistance which, however varied in the successive acts of embargo, non-intercourse, or non-importation, was evidently unequal in its operation, and principally levelled against the superior commerce, and maritime power of Great Britain.—The same partiality towards France was observable, in their negotiations, as in their measures of alleged resistance.—Application was made to both Belligerents for a revocation of their respective edicts; but the terms in which they were made were widely different.—Of France was required a revocation only of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, although many other edicts, grossly violating the neutral commerce of the United States, had been promulgated by that Power. No

security was demanded, that the Berlin and Milan Decrees, even if revoked, should not under some other form be re-established; and a direct engagement was offered, that upon such revocation, the American Government would take part in the war against Great Britain, if Great Britain did not immediately rescind her Orders.—Whereas no corresponding engagement was offered to Great Britain, of whom it was required, not only that the Orders in Council should be repealed, but that no others of a similar nature should be issued, and that the blockade of May, 1806, should be also abandoned. This blockade, established and enforced according to accustomed practice, had not been objected to by the United States at the time it was issued. Its provisions were on the contrary represented by the American Minister resident in London at the time, to have been so framed, as to afford, in his judgment, a proof of the friendly disposition of the British Cabinet towards the United States.—Great Britain was thus called upon to abandon one of her most important maritime rights, by acknowledging the Order of blockade in question, to be one of the edicts which violated the commerce of the United States, although it had never been so considered in the previous negotiations;—and although the President of the United States had recently consented to abrogate the Non-Intercourse Act, on the sole condition of the Orders in Council being revoked; thereby distinctly admitting these orders to be the only edicts which fell within the contemplation of the law, under which he acted.—A proposition so hostile to Great Britain could not but be proportionably encouraging to the pretensions of the enemy; as by thus alleging that the blockade of May 1806, was illegal, the American Government virtually justified, so far as depended on them, the French Decrees.—After this proposition had been made, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, if not in concert with that Government, at least in conformity with its views, in a dispatch, dated the 5th of August, 1810, and addressed to the American Minister resident at Paris, stated that the Berlin and Milan Decrees were revoked, and that their operation would cease from the 1st day of November following, provided His Majesty would revoke his Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade; or that the United States would cause their rights to be respected; meaning thereby,

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that they would resist the retaliatory measures of Great Britain.—Although the repeal of the French Decrees thus announced was evidently contingent, either on concessions to be made by Great Britain, (concessions to which it was obvious Great Britain could not submit,) or on measures to be adopted by the United States of America; the American President at once considered the repeal as absolute. Under that pretence, the Non-Importation Act was strictly enforced against Great Britain, whilst the ships of war, and merchant ships of the enemy were received into the harbours of America.—The American Government, assuming the repeal of the French Decrees to be absolute, and effectual, most unjustly required Great Britain, in conformity to her declarations, to revoke her Orders in Council. The British Government denied that the repeal, which was announced in the letter of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was such as ought to satisfy Great Britain; and in order to ascertain the true character of the measures adopted by France, the Government of the United States was called upon to produce the instrument, by which the alleged repeal of the French Decrees had been effected. If these Decrees were really revoked, such an instrument must exist, and no satisfactory reason could be given for withholding it.—At length, on the 21st of May 1812, and not before, the American Minister in London did produce a copy, or at least what purported to be a copy, of such an instrument.—It professed to bear date the 28th of April 1811, long subsequent to the dispatch of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 5th of August 1810, or even the day named therein, viz. the 1st of November following, when the operation of the French Decrees was to cease. This instrument expressly declared that these French Decrees were repealed in consequence of the American Legislature having, by their Act of the 1st of March 1811, provided, that British ships and merchandize should be excluded from the ports and harbours of the United States.

By this instrument, the only document produced by America, as a repeal of the French Decrees, it appears beyond a possibility of doubt or cavil, that the alleged repeal of the French Decrees was conditional, as Great Britain had asserted; and not absolute or final, as had been maintained by America: that they were not repealed at the time they were stated to be

repealed by the American Government: that they were not repealed in conformity with a proposition simultaneously made to both Belligerents, but that in consequence of a previous Act on the part of the American Government, they were repealed in favour of one Belligerent, to the prejudice of the other: that the American Government having adopted measures restrictive upon the commerce of both Belligerents, in consequence of Edicts issued by both, rescinded these measures, as they effected that power, which was the aggressor, whilst they put them in full operation against the party aggrieved; although the Edicts of both powers continued in force; and lastly, that they excluded the ships of war, belonging to one Belligerent, whilst they admitted into their ports and harbours the ships of war belonging to the other, in violation of one of the plainest and most essential duties of a neutral nation. Although the instrument thus produced was by no means that general and unqualified revocation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, which Great Britain had continually demanded, and had a full right to claim; and although this instrument, under all the circumstances of its appearance at that moment, for the first time, was open to the strongest suspicions of its authenticity; yet, as the Minister of the United States produced it, as purporting to be a copy of the instrument of revocation, the Government of Great Britain, desirous of reverting, if possible, to the ancient and accustomed principles of maritime war, determined upon revoking conditionally the Orders in Council. Accordingly, in the month, of June last, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent was pleased to declare in Council, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, that the Orders in Council should be revoked, as far as respected the ships and property of the United States, from the 1st of August following. This revocation was to continue in force, provided the Government of the United States should, within a time to be limited, repeal their restrictive laws against British commerce. His Majesty's Minister in America was expressly ordered to declare to the Government of the United States, that "this measure had been adopted by the Prince Regent in the earnest wish and hope, either that the Government of France, by further relaxations of its system, might render perseverance on the part of Great Britain in retaliatory measures unnecessary, or if this hope should prove delusive, that His

“Majesty’s Government might be enabled, in the absence of all irritating and restrictive regulations on either side, to enter with the Government of the United States into amicable explanations, for the purpose of ascertaining whether, if the necessity of retaliatory measures should unfortunately continue to operate, the particular measures to be acted upon by Great Britain, could be rendered more acceptable to the American Government, than those hitherto pursued.”—In order to provide for the contingency of a Declaration of War on the part of the United States, previous to the arrival in America of the said Order of Revocation, instructions were sent to His Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the United States (the execution of which instructions, in consequence of the discontinuance of Mr. Foster’s functions, were at a subsequent period intrusted to Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren), directing him to propose a cessation of hostilities, should they have commenced; and further to offer a simultaneous repeal of the Orders in Council on the one side, and of the Restrictive Laws on the British ships and commerce on the other.—They were also respectively empowered to acquaint the American Government, in reply to any inquiries with respect to the blockade of May, 1806, whilst the British Government must continue to maintain its legality,—“That in point of fact this particular Blockade had been discontinued for a length of time, having been merged in the general retaliatory blockade of the enemy’s ports under the Orders in Council, and that His Majesty’s Government had no intention of recurring to this, or to any other of the blockades of the enemy’s ports, founded upon the ordinary and accustomed principles of Maritime Law, which were in force previous to the Orders in Council, without a new notice to Neutral Powers in the usual form.”—The American Government, before they received intimation of the course adopted by the British Government, had in fact proceeded to the extreme measure of declaring war, and issuing “Letters of Marque,” notwithstanding they were previously in possession of the Report of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, of the 12th of March, 1812, promulgating anew the Berlin and Milan Decrees, as fundamental laws of the French Empire, under the false and extravagant pretext, that the monstrous principles therein contained were to be found in the

Treaty of Utrecht, and were therefore binding upon all States. From the penalties of this Code no nation was to be exempt, which did not accept it, not only as the rule of its own conduct, but as a law, the observance of which it was also required to enforce upon Great Britain.—In a Manifesto, accompanying their Declaration of hostilities, in addition to the former complaints against the Orders in Council, a long list of grievances was brought forward; some trivial in themselves, others which had been mutually adjusted, but none of them such as were ever before alleged by the American Government to be grounds for war.—As if to throw additional obstacles in the way of peace, the American Congress at the same time passed a law, prohibiting all intercourse with Great Britain, of such a tenor, as deprived the Executive Government, according to the President’s own construction of that Act, of all power of restoring the relations of friendly intercourse between the two States, so far at least as concerned their commercial Interchange, until Congress should re-assemble.—The President of the United States, has, it is true, since proposed to Great Britain an Armistice; not, however, on the admission, that the cause of war hitherto relied on was removed: but on condition that Great Britain, as a preliminary step, should do away a cause of war, now brought forward as such for the first time; namely, that she should abandon the exercise of her undoubted right of search, to take from American merchant vessels British seamen, the natural-born subjects of His Majesty; and this concession was required upon a mere assurance that laws would be enacted by the Legislature of the United States, to prevent such seamen from entering into their service; but independent of the objection to an exclusive reliance on a Foreign State, for the conservation of so vital an interest, no explanation was, or could be afforded by the Agent who was charged with this Overture, either as to the main principles upon which such laws were to be founded, or as to the provisions which it was proposed they should contain.—This proposition having been objected to, a second proposal was made, again offering an Armistice, provided the British Government would secretly stipulate to renounce the exercise of this Right in a Treaty of Peace. An immediate and formal abandonment of its exercise, as a preliminary to a cessation of hostilities, was not demanded; but his

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Royal Highness the Prince Regent was required, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, secretly to abandon what the former Overture had proposed to him publicly to concede.—This most offensive proposition was also rejected, being accompanied, as the former had been, by other demands of the most exceptionable nature, and especially of indemnity for all American vessels detained and condemned under the Orders in Council, or under what were termed illegal blockades—a compliance with which demands, exclusive of all other objections, would have amounted to an absolute surrender of the rights on which those Orders and Blockades were founded.—Had the American Government been sincere in representing the Orders in Council, as the only subject of difference between Great Britain and the United States, calculated to lead to hostilities; it might have been expected, so soon as the revocation of those Orders had been officially made known to them, that they would have spontaneously recalled their “letters of marque,” and manifested a disposition immediately to restore the relations of peace and amity between the two Powers.—But the conduct of the Government of the United States by no means corresponded with such reasonable expectations.—The Order in Council of the 23d of June being officially communicated in America, the Government of the United States, saw nothing in the repeal of the Orders in Council, which should of itself restore Peace, unless Great Britain were prepared, in the first instance, substantially to relinquish the right of impressing her own seamen when found on board American merchant ships.—The proposal of an Armistice, and of a simultaneous Repeal of the restrictive measures on both sides, subsequently made by the commanding officer of His Majesty’s naval forces on the American coast, were received in the same hostile spirit by the Government of the United States. The suspension of the practice of impressment was insisted upon in the Correspondence which passed on that occasion, as a necessary preliminary to a cessation of hostilities:—Negotiation, it was stated, might take place without any suspension of the exercise of this right, and also without any Armistice being concluded; but Great Britain was required previously to agree, without any knowledge of the adequacy of the system which could be substituted, to negotiate upon the basis of accepting the Legislative

Regulations of a foreign State, as the sole equivalent for the exercise of a right which she has felt to be essential to the support of her maritime power.—If America, by demanding this preliminary concession, intends to deny the validity of that right, in that denial Great Britain cannot acquiesce; nor will she give countenance to such a pretension, by acceding to its suspension, much less to its abandonment, as a basis on which to treat. If the American Government has devised, or conceives it can devise, regulations, which may safely be accepted by Great Britain, as a substitute for the exercise of the right in question; it is for them to bring forward such a plan for consideration. The British Government has never attempted to exclude this question from amongst those on which the two States might have to negotiate: It has, on the contrary, uniformly professed its readiness to receive and discuss any proposition on this subject, coming from the American Government: It has never asserted any exclusive right as to the impressment of British seamen from American vessels, which it was not prepared to acknowledge as appertaining equally to the Government of the United States, with respect to American seamen when found on board British merchant ships:—But it cannot, by acceding to such a basis in the first instance, either assume, or admit that to be practicable, which, when attempted on former occasions, has always been found to be attended with great difficulties; such difficulties as the British Commissioners in 1806, expressly declared, after an attentive consideration of the suggestions brought forward by the Commissioners on the part of America, they were unable to surmount.—Whilst this proposition, transmitted through the British Admiral, was pending in America, another communication on the subject of an armistice was unofficially made to the British Government in this country. The Agent, from whom this proposition was received, acknowledged that he did not consider that he had any authority himself to sign an agreement on the part of his Government. It was obvious that any stipulations entered into, in consequence of this overture, would have been binding on the British Government, whilst the Government of the United States would have been free to refuse or accept them, according to the circumstances of the moment: this proposition was therefore necessarily declined.—After this exposition of the circum-

stances which preceded, and which have followed the Declaration of War by the United States, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, feels himself called upon to declare the leading principles by which the conduct of Great Britain has been regulated in the transactions connected with these discussions.—His Royal Highness can never acknowledge any blockade whatsoever to be illegal, which has been duly notified, and is supported by an adequate force, merely upon the ground of its extent, or because the ports, or coasts blockaded, are not at the same time invested by land.—His Royal Highness can never admit that neutral trade with Great Britain can be constituted a public crime, the commission of which can expose the ships of any power whatever to be denationalized.—His Royal Highness can never admit that Great Britain can be debarred of its right of just and necessary retaliation, through the fear of eventually affecting the interest of a neutral.—His Royal Highness can never admit, that in the exercise of the undoubted and hitherto undisputed right of searching neutral merchant vessels in time of war, the impressment of British seamen, when found therein, can be deemed any violation of a neutral flag. Neither can he admit, that the taking such seamen from on board such vessel, can be considered by any Neutral State, as a hostile measure, or a justifiable cause of war.—There is no right more clearly established, than the right which a Sovereign has to the allegiance of his subjects, more especially in time of war. Their allegiance is no optional duty, which they can decline, and resume at pleasure. It is a call which they are bound to obey: it began with their birth, and can only terminate with their existence.—If a similarity of language and manners may make the exercise of this right more liable to partial mistakes, and occasional abuse, when practised towards vessels of the United States, the same circumstances make it also a right, with the exercise of which, in regard to such vessels, it is more difficult to dispense. But if, to the practice of the United States, to harbour British seamen, be added their assumed right to transfer the allegiance of British subjects, and thus to cancel the jurisdiction of their legitimate sovereign, by acts of naturalization and certificates of citizenship, which they pretend to be as valid out of their own territory, as within it, it is ob-

vious, that to abandon this ancient right of Great Britain, and to admit these novel pretensions of the United States, would be to expose to danger the very foundation of our maritime strength.—Without entering minutely into the other topics, which have been brought forward by the Government of the United States, it may be proper to remark, that whatever the Declaration of the United States may have asserted, Great Britain never did demand that they should force British manufactures into France; and she formally declared her willingness entirely to forego, or modify, in concert with the United States, the system by which a commercial intercourse with the enemy had been allowed, under the protection of licenses; provided the United States would act towards her, and towards France, with real impartiality.—The Government of America, if the differences between States are not interminable, has as little right to notice the affair of the Chesapeake. The aggression in this instance, on the part of a British officer, was acknowledged, his conduct was disapproved, and a reparation was regularly tendered by Mr. Foster on the part of His Majesty, and accepted by the Government of the United States.—It is not less unwarranted in its allusion to the mission of Mr. Henry; a mission undertaken without the authority, or even knowledge of His Majesty's Government, and which Mr. Foster was authorized formally and officially to disavow.—The charge of exciting the Indians to offensive measures against the United States, is equally void of foundation. Before the war began, a policy the most opposite had been uniformly pursued, and proof of this was tendered by Mr. Foster to the American Government.—Such are the causes of war which have been put forward by the Government of the United States. But the real origin of the present contest will be found in that spirit, which has long unhappily actuated the Councils of the United States; their marked partiality in palliating and assisting the aggressive tyranny of France; their systematic endeavours to inflame their people against the defensive measures of Great Britain; their ungenerous conduct towards Spain, the intimate ally of Great Britain; and their unworthy desertion of the cause of other neutral nations. It is through the prevalence of such councils that America has been associated in policy with France; and committed in war against Great Britain.—And under what

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conduct on the part of France has the Government of the United States thus lent itself to the enemy? The contemptuous violation of the Commercial Treaty of the year 1800 between France and the United States; the treacherous seizure of all American vessels and cargoes in every harbour subject to the control of the French arms; the tyrannical principles of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, and the confiscations under them; the subsequent condemnations under the Rambouillet Decree, antedated or concealed to render it the more effectual; the French commercial regulations, which render the traffic of the United States with France almost illusory; the burning of their merchant ships at sea, long after the alleged repeal of the French Decrees—all these acts of violence on the part of France, produce from the Government of the United States, only such complaints as end in acquiescence and submission, or are accompanied by suggestions for enabling France to give the semblance of a legal form to her usurpations, by converting them into municipal regulations.—This disposition of the Government of the United States—this complete subserviency to the Ruler of France—this hostile temper towards Great Britain—are evident in almost every page of the official correspondence of the American with the French Government.—Against this course of conduct, the real cause of the present war, the Prince Regent solemnly protests. Whilst contending against France, in defence not only of the liberties of Great Britain, but of the world, His Royal Highness was entitled to look for a far different result. From their common origin—from their common interest—from their professed principles of freedom and independence, the United States were the last power in which Great Britain could have expected to find a willing instrument, and abettor of French tyranny.—Disappointed in this his just expectation, the Prince Regent will still pursue the policy which the British Government has so long, and invariably maintained, in repelling injustice, and in supporting the general rights of nations; and, under the favour of Providence, relying on the justice of his cause, and the tried loyalty and firmness of the British nation, His Royal Highness confidently looks forward to a successful issue to the contest, in which he has thus been compelled most reluctantly to engage.

Westminster, Jan. 9, 1813.

RUSSIAN BULLETINS.

Report from General Count Wittgenstein to His Imperial Majesty, dated Berisow, Nov. 28.

(Continued from page 64.)

feet. The loss on our side is not great. I am to-day going to attack Napoleon at the town of Studentzy. Admiral Tschitschagow and Count Platow will attack him on the other side of the river Berisena.

The same General reports, under date of 12th (24th) November, from the village of Tschvuga, as follows:—

Admiral Tschitschagow arrived on the 22d at Berisow, from whence the General of infantry, Langeron, reports to me in two letters of the 10th (22d) instant, that Adjutant-General Count Lambert took possession of Berisow on the 9th (21st) and there defeated the whole of Dombrowski's corps, taking six cannon and two stands of colours, and making 3,000 prisoners; the remainder of this beaten corps marched off on the road to Orscha.—Count Lambert also took two pieces of artillery at Kaidenow, and made about 3,000 prisoners, and had in all, in the course of eight days, made about 11,000 prisoners, including the sick that were found in the hospitals at Minsk, and taken 24 cannon. Victor and Oudinot are retreating before me towards Berisow. I am in pursuit of them, and yesterday took upwards of 800 prisoners and a number of baggage waggons. The General of cavalry, Count Platow, is already in pursuit of the enemy's grand army towards Totoschin. Your Imperial Majesty will please to perceive by this statement, that we are compressing the enemy on three sides. General Count Platow pursues them on the rear; I act on their flank; and Admiral Tschitschagow will receive him at Berisow.—*Petersburgh Gazette, Dec. 1.*

The same Paper contains a dispatch from Prince Kutusow, dated Lanniku, 23d November, stating that Napoleon left Orscha on the 20th November, and detailing the means he had adopted for pursuing him.

Petersburgh, Dec. 1.

Intercepted Letter from the Prince of Neuchatel to Marshal Davoust, Prince of Eckmühl.

It is the wish of the Emperor, that you support the Duke of Elchingen in the re-

treat which he is making with his rear-guard, while the Viceroy, to-morrow the 27th, will march to take post at Krasnoi. You will, therefore, take care to occupy the post which you shall judge advisable, and which the Viceroy shall evacuate. The intention of the Emperor is, that you, with your corps, and that of the Duke of Elchingen's, retire from Krasnoi, and make this movement on the 28th and 29th. General Charpentier, with his garrison, consisting of three-third Polish battalions, and a regiment of cavalry, will leave the town at the same time with the rear. Before you march out you will blow up the ramparts which surround Smolensko, as the mines are ready, and only need to be set fire to. You will take care that the ammunition, powder-chests, and every thing that cannot be carried away, be destroyed and burnt, as also the muskets; the cannon should be buried. Generals Chasseloup and Louissiere will take care, each in his department, to carry these orders into proper execution:—You will take care to send out patrols, that no marauders remain behind; and you will also leave as few persons as possible in the hospitals.

(Signed) Prince of Neufchatel, Maj.-Gen.

ALEXANDER.

Smolensko, 2d (14) Nov.

A true account of the manner in which the Prince of Eckmuhl executed the orders of the Emperor Napoleon, transmitted to him in the dispatch to the Prince of Neufchatel:—

Before Marshal Davoust left Smolensko, he in fact executed the orders he had received, but only in such manner as characterizes a flying enemy. He caused the mines to be sprung; set fire to 800 powder chests; and in his own person set the example to the incendiaries, who, notwithstanding the endeavours of Marshal Ney to prevent it, were spreading the flames into all parts of the city. After this proof of his valour, Marshal Davoust marched with his corps in such disorder as would have reflected disgrace on conscripts, and thus proceeded, on Krasnoi, where, although he was supported by several corps of the Imperial guards, who formed the remainder of the 4th corps d'armee; and although

stimulated by the presence of Napoleon, he was totally defeated on the 5th (17th) of this month. He himself escaped with great difficulty; he lost his artillery, his baggage, his staff of command, all his equipages, and even a part of those belonging to the Emperor his master. Thus the Marshal's staff, which Louis Nicholas Davoust received on the 29th Floreal, and the year 12, is added to the number of victories, which will serve as a testimony to posterity of the melancholy fate which has befallen this vanquished army, which dared to make an irruption into the Russian empire, in a manner worthy of the Vandals. Marshal Davoust being by this defeat cut off from the corps of Marshal Ney, was so far from being able to support him, that it was not even in his power to give him information of the destruction of his own corps. Marshal Ney experienced the same fate on the next day, the 6th (18th) ditto. He took the same road, and after a battle, which was decided on both sides by the naked sword, 12,000 men laid down their arms. In one word, Marshal Ney's corps, and the whole garrison of Smolensko were made prisoners to a man. The number of cannon that fell into the hands of the Russians on both those days amounts to upwards of 190. Marshal Ney has fled through the woods, where our yagers are searching for him.—*St. Petersburg, 19th Nov. (1st Dec.)*

Twer, Nov. 20.—Our brave troops in pursuit of the enemy continue incessantly to gain victories. Every day French prisoners are brought in by hundreds and by thousands, which have been sent by the corps of Count Wittgenstein. A great number of cannon have likewise been taken. The roads to Dorogobush are covered for the distance of several wersts with the dead bodies of the enemy, and the rivers on those roads are entirely filled with their bodies and with their dead horses.

Tula, Nov. 16.—On the 13th inst. 1,200 French prisoners were taken through this city, on the Kasan road; they are dreadfully exhausted and covered with rags.—*(Same Paper.)*

From the Berlin Gazette of Dec. 3.

Vienna, Nov. 24.—The report that negotiations towards a general Peace will
(To be continued.)